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Certification Schemes and Labelling as Corporate Governance: the Value of Silence 
Tomaso Ferrando 
Introduction 
If we were to walk along the shelves of any large-scale retailers in the Global North we would notice that 
they are constantly refilled with products that come with small logos attached. Images of trees, frogs and 
fish are increasingly appearing on packaging, labels and websites, together with the words like ‘organic’, 
‘bio’ and ‘sustainable’. Although these pictures and codes seldom offer an explanation of their meaning 
and instead rely on the appeal of a design and its catchy acronym, they seem capable of persuading 
wealthy and conscious consumers of the reasonableness and legitimacy of their claim. Moreover, they are 
often perceived as a sophisticated and effective source of buyers’ collective power.  
From the point of view of the market–consumer relationship, however, the graphical representation of the 
(often not specified) standard operates as the visible sign of the not-so-visible mechanism of capitalist 
expansion and consolidation of transnational value chains. In particular, the little frog associated with the 
protection of rain forests has three main functions: from a governance perspective, it produces in 
customers the expectation and the belief that they are purchasing products that have not been obtained 
through environmental destruction, slavery or other forms of rampant exploitation; economically, it 
justifies the extra premium that is generally paid in order to have access to a ‘superior’ class of 
commodities; morally, it convinces the broader public that a change in the way in which businesses 
operate shall not be achieved by acting against corporate actors or by sanctioning those who release 
negative externalities, but rather by rewarding those businesses that openly declare that they are following 
‘higher standards’.  
However, this article claims that these certifications and ecolabels are based on an inherent contradiction 
that leads to often unnoticed consequences. Despite the underlying assumption that these mechanisms of 
corporate governance lead to more transparency in the market, it is a matter of fact that sustainability 
statements appear only on some products. As a consequence, labelled goods are transformed into the 
exceptional and unique. On the other hand, images and statements that highlight the exploitative or 
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unhealthy nature of products – what could be called ‘non-ecolabels’ – are almost non-existent in the 
market and have been strongly opposed by multinational corporations operating in different sectors (from 
cocoa to computers).1 In the absence of mandatory requirements of negative disclosure, violations and 
exploitations that occur outside of the ‘sustainability sphere’ are invisible and normalized by the 
multiplicity and complexity of transnational production. Therefore, logos and no-logos must be 
understood as the two sides of the same exploitative system: two mutually supportive sources of value 
that depend on each other and foster the reproduction of transnational corporate capitalism.2 
Certification and ecolabelling as mechanisms of corporate regulation 
The worldwide legal order is increasingly filled with national and international laws that guarantee rights 
and protect individuals. However, the history of the state–capital–people interaction is riddled with denial 
of justice, uncompensated exploitation of labour and natural resources and the growth in the gap between 
law in books and law in action. This is evident in the Global South, where land is constantly enclosed and 
communities evicted, where people live in slums deprived of basic services, the environment is constantly 
treated as a coffer for rich investments, and production chains thrive among sweatshops and quasi-bond 
labour.3 As a response to the expansion in ‘non-internalized negative externalities’, public and private 
actors have proposed legal and quasi-legal solutions that aim to improve the way in which businesses 
operate. Often conceived as separated and belonging to two different spheres, these mechanisms of 
corporate governance and corporate accountability are both based on the assumption that exploitation is 
the product of misbehaviour and not an inherent characteristic of the system of production. 
On the public side, most attention has been directed towards the establishment of access to justice 
programmes, legal empowering campaigns, and the strengthening of judicial autonomy and courts’ 
independence that can be financed with grants, education and new facilities. The idea is that aware 
communities and an efficient judicial system can enforce legal order and discipline, eventually conducting 
business practices under the framework of legality. Related to that, international and national civil society 
have been increasingly focusing on the use of human rights law to construct legal strategies and file law 
suits within and outside the national jurisdiction where the violations occur, including by means of 
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multiple actions undertaken in different legal orders.4  
However, it is the area of private and quasi-private responses as post-national mechanisms of global 
governance that has attracted most of the attention and the majority of the available resources (see e.g. 
Eslava, 2008; Shamir 2008; 2010; Dolan and Johnstone-Louis, 2011; Rajak, 2011; Ferrando, 2014). 
Among the many forms that these mechanisms of self-governance have adopted, certification schemes 
and ecolabelling are those that are increasingly gaining space and visibility. A typical example of a well-
known labelling scheme is Fairtrade, which consists of a set of rules and standards that, when respected, 
provide sellers of goods and products with the opportunity to display a logo on the packaging of the final 
product, on their website or in their communications.  
Fully informed by the idea of markets as competitive and independent arenas for business, certifications 
and labels are systems of corporate social responsibility and value chain control based on the idea of 
‘regulation by information’ as a private alternative to direct control. According to the underlying 
paradigm, ‘[l]ogos, labels and product claims are direct communication channels to consumers. They can 
help consumers assess and compare products on the market or guide them towards more sustainable, 
healthy and responsible choices’ so as to favour those businesses and products that, for example, help 
conserve scarce resources, preserve biodiversity, or provide a living wage for workers (European 
Commission, 2012: 25). 
The proliferation of certification and ecolabel 
The use of certifications and labels is embedded in the ideological paradigm that represents corporate 
social responsibility as a win-win-win profit-maximization strategy. In this framework, they are an 
expression of the triple hope that: (wealthy) consumers will be offered goods that have an extra quality 
compared to the competitors; (some lucky) dolphins, turtles and trees will be spared from the process of 
continuous exploitation and commercialization; and (oligopolistic) issuers and producers that disclose 
their positive conducts to concerned consumers will be rewarded with higher sales. In an era of neoliberal 
solutions to neoliberal contradictions, it should not come as surprise that certification schemes and 
ecolabelling are proliferating and increasingly utilized as a marketing strategy.  
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Certainly, consumers interested in going beyond logos and names would quickly realize that not all 
certification and labelling schemes are the same. In particular, each scheme has ‘its own criteria, 
assessment processes, levels of transparency and sponsors’ (Washington and Ababouch, 2011). For 
example, the Fairtrade protocol and its logo emerged from the collaboration between Mexican coffee 
farmers and Dutch individuals, whereas the Roundtable on Sustainable Oil Production and the Better 
Sugar Initiative (Bonsucro) are membership-based associations that are financed by their business 
members and overseen by multi-stakeholder groups involving nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
industry members and representatives of civil society.  
In the fishing sector alone, the proliferation of ecolabels has seen private actors, NGOs and public 
authorities launching multiple certification schemes and labelling regimes that differ in scope, structure 
and objective. In particular, multi-stakeholders initiatives that involve corporations and civil society are 
the most diffused. Among those, the blue fish of the Marine Stewardship Council, which is considered to 
be the most utilized and recognizable in the industry, began as a multi-stakeholder certification scheme 
set up by the World Wildlife Fund and Unilever in 19975 but now claims to be a legally and financially 
independent non-profit scheme that receives its funds from grants, private foundations and the royalties 
paid by companies for the use of its logo on a product.  
However, companies and public authorities have not missed the opportunity to launch their own schemes. 
On the industry side, Pescanova, one of Europe’s largest fishing companies, has launched its own fully 
private system of logos and certifications. A proportion of the fish that it catches and distributes is, in fact, 
labelled with an image created by the company that represents the claim that it has been internally 
certified as caught in accordance with the company’s own code of conduct. In the public sector, one of the 
most talked-about cases is that of the government of France, which in 2008 created its own national 
certification scheme and ecolabel (Label Rouge) so that ‘sustainable’ French producers could be more 
easily identified and obtain a double competitive advantage in the French market over non-certified and 
foreign-certified products.6  
As the reader is certainly aware, the exponential diffusion of these instruments has been explored in 
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several studies and investigations that have underlined the various reasons why private certification 
schemes and labelling may be nothing more than a travesty of corporate governance. For example, 
concerns have been raised with regards to the conflicts of interest that are inherent in industry-based 
mechanisms where the controlled is also the controller or financially linked to the controller; the massive 
presence of corporate representatives on the boards of trustees of certification and labelling schemes; the 
potential for companies to have different lines of production and continue profiting from the sale of 
cheaper and non-compliant products; and the lack of real and transparent information concerning internal 
procedures and the meaning of the labels.  
Similar scepticism has arisen around the issue that certifications could legitimate the productivist and 
exploitative status quo by favouring ‘greenwashing’ through the selection of vague and non-mandatory 
standards.7 For example, the World Rainforest Movement (WRM) is at the forefront of a campaign 
against the certification scheme of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) which is accused of legitimizing 
land-grabbing, forest degradation, water depletion and favouring greenwashing by the companies that 
proudly display its logo.8 Moreover, there have been several cases that demonstrate the fact that 
certifications and ecolabels are sometimes defined and enforced without proper information from and 
involvement of the local producing communities. In addition, because of problems with compatibility 
between labels and transnational chains of production, violations of standards are difficult to 
discover/monitor for the consumer relying on a particular label.  
Vietnam, for example, is the second largest exporter of coffee in the world and is a preferred source for 
Robusta beans used to produce instant coffee. However, its production takes place on small (1 to 5 
hectare) farmsteads scattered all over the landscape whose harvests are collected by intermediaries and 
then sold to other – larger – operators along the chain. Such fragmentation and hierarchization of actors 
reduce the bargaining power of local producers vis-à-vis larger intermediaries and increase the distance 
between consumers and agricultural production. As a consequence, there is a very limited possibility of 
accurately knowing where and how our mug of instant coffee is produced; or of checking that the 
‘organic’ or ‘bio’ labels are actually representative of the reality of production; or that tangible and 
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effective countermeasures are adopted when communities or their eco-systems are affected by the 
intensification of land exploitation through the use of excessive fertilizers – as in the case for Vietnamese 
coffee.9 
More recently, representatives of international organizations and global value chain scholars have also 
criticized the multiplication of certification schemes and the adoption of stringent production standards 
because of the oligopolistic effects that they produce and their negative implications on small producers 
and weaker actors in the chain (Vorley and Fox, 2004; Vandermeer, 2006; Chemnitz et al, 2007; De 
Schutter, 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Asfaw et al, 2010). Especially in the agrifood sector, the 
costs of compliance (the complexity and the timing required by some retailers and certification 
mechanisms) can seldom be sustained by small-scale producers and therefore increase their dependency 
on large-scale players and favour the concentration of market shares. Despite the generalized perception, 
it would be a mistake to consider that certification and ecolabels are always pro-farmers and as such 
redistribute value downward along the structure of production. On the contrary, the opposite is often true 
(Swinnen et al, 2013). 
Certifications between visibility and invisibility 
Despite the validity and correctness of these critiques, there is some space for ecolabelling and 
certifications to improve the way in which production takes place, labour is treated, the environment is 
protected and value is distributed along the chain. However, it appears clear that this transformative 
opportunity conflicts with the profit maximization purpose and strategy of value accumulation that is 
pursued by transnational capital. For this reason, the next two sections of this short article focus on the 
partiality of the current certification paradigm and its role in reproducing global exploitative capitalism. 
In particular, they offer some preliminary thoughts on the double strategy adopted by some multinational 
enterprises: on the one hand, transnational capital supports transparency and certification schemes 
whenever sustainable features of production chains are disclosed; on the other side, it fiercely opposes 
such schemes whenever they are capable of making exploitation less invisible.  
Instead of talking about labels and certifications that consumers find on some products that they buy, I 
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have decided to focus on those images and statements that buyers do not find and that, in the absence of a 
widespread and strong public campaign, they will never find. All around the world, transnational 
corporations that praise the regulatory power of competitive markets and that rely on labels to conduct 
dialogue with ‘informed consumers’ have been politically and legally opposing public laws requiring 
them to inform consumers about their products’ links with, for example, worldwide slavery, guerrilla 
movements in Congo or genetically modified organisms (GMOs). As evident from the example of 
‘conflict minerals’ discussed below, when disclosure concerns a marketable characteristic of the good, 
corporations are claiming that it is important to provide this information to consumers so that they can 
properly understand the quality of what they are consuming and reward virtuous value chains. However, 
when the same companies are asked by civil society (or required by law) to disclose information that may 
negatively impact upon their sales, consumers are characterized as being incapable of understanding such 
information and any form of transparency is strongly opposed. 
As a consequence of this – not so surprising – discrepancy, goods that are obtained in circumstances that 
respect peoples’ dignity and are in line with environmental benefits are transformed into exceptional 
products around which marketing divisions can set up a vanity fair. Thus, the graphic representation of 
sustainable practices, by means of trees, frogs, and ‘GMO-free’ labels increasingly appear on packages 
because they can be exploited to generate extra margins. At the same time, however, violations, 
contaminations and deprivations are hidden among all the other non-special products that can be found in 
any supermarket. As a consequence of this silence, the ‘real costs’ of goods are hidden and problems at 
the root of the unsustainability of global production, which ought to be under the spotlight and openly 
exposed, are barely distinguishable to consumers (even the most concerned ones) in their daily shopping. 
In the absence of investigations and mandatory labelling requirements, exploitation is hidden from sight 
in the multitude of goods and, thus, is normalized.  
In the neoliberal world of communicative illusion, final consumers are exclusively exposed to glittering 
information about those (few) products that are obtained – at least on paper – in compliance with 
fundamental human rights, the needs of the environment or without the use of genetically modified crops 
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because there is an added incentive to buy them. On the other hand, information that may produce the 
opposite incentive and dismantle the idea of empowered consumerism is hidden, camouflaged in 
supermarket aisles among other goods and services and stripped of any clear indication that may 
challenge the marketable truth incorporated in pro-consumer labelling and certifications.  
If that is the case, it would be wrong to think that logos and no-logos are representative of two different 
forms of production and two different economic systems. On the contrary, they are complementary 
conditions of neoliberal capitalism. Through labels and certifications capital can extract ‘bright value’ by 
transforming socially responsible activities into exceptional practices, flagging the positive aspects of 
chains of production, and utilizing transparency as a marketing vehicle. At the same time, the absence of 
labels and the creation of an undistinguished basket of ‘normalized products’ facilitate the covering-up of 
inconvenient linkages, create confusion in consumers by assimilating exploitative products with ‘anything 
that is not specifically indicated as sustainable’, and help to accumulate ‘dark value’ by means of 
ignorance, lobbying and legal attacks (Clelland, 2014). 
Neoliberal wonderland: the uncostitutionality of negative certification 
The economic relevance that companies attribute to partial truths, silence and selective information is 
exemplified by the claim filed in the Court of the District of Columbia by the (US) National Association 
of Manufacturers (NAM) et al. against the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC).10 At the centre of 
the judicial quarrel was the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s freedom of speech committed by the 
disclosure requirements introduced by section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 2012 regulation of the 
SEC.11 Although the Bill had as its objective to regulate financial actors and avoid a new transnational 
meltdown like the collapse of 2008–2010, it also contained two public interventions whose objective was 
to indirectly intervene in the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and reduce 
investors’ risk by requiring those companies filing reports with SEC to disclose specific information 
concerning their supply chains.12  
Inspired by the paradigm of ‘regulation by information’, aware of the ubiquity of ‘conflict minerals’ in 
everyday life,13 and confident about the power of consumers and businesses to determine and direct 
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companies’ sourcing practices through their purchasing behaviours, US Congress and the SEC crafted a 
sophisticated mechanism of annual due diligence and auditing requirements aimed at identifying and 
singling out products not found to be ‘DRC conflict free’.14 Without entering into too much detail, the 
structure of the regulation requires companies: 
... first, to figure out if their products contain conflict minerals and, second, to determine where 
those minerals come from. It also wants companies to report how they go about this exercise, and 
for those companies potentially sourcing conflict minerals from militarized mines to list the 
products in which such minerals are contained. (Schwartz, 2015: 7). 
Therefore, if companies have reason to believe that their products contain minerals originating from the 
Congo region, they are required to conduct due diligence ‘on the source and chain of custody’ of such 
minerals. At that point, if companies determine that minerals are not from the Congo region they only 
have to briefly describe the due diligence efforts, the Reasonable Country of Origin Inquiry and their 
conclusion on a form to be sent to the SEC (Form SD) and placed on their publicly available website. 
Otherwise, if the due diligence is unable to rule out the possibility that their conflict minerals were 
extracted in the DRC region, they must file a more complex ‘Conflict Minerals Report’15 (which also 
requires an independent auditor’s due diligence certification), draft a list of products that have not been 
found to be ‘DRC conflict free’16 and make it publicly available on the company’s website.  
Only a few days after the release of the SEC regulation, the National Association of Manufacturers, the 
US Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable challenged it in federal court.17 Of the three 
issues raised by the plaintiffs, the third concerned the fact that ‘the requirement to describe products as 
“having not been found to be DRC conflict free”’ represented a free speech violation. After the 
Washington DC District Court had found none of the arguments compelling, at appeal the Circuit Court 
confirmed two-thirds of the previous judgment but reversed it in the part where it did not recognize that 
the requirement to label products as specified violates corporate free speech rights. Reheard in 2015 upon 
request of the SEC and Amnesty International,18 the judgment was recently confirmed.19  
In the court’s opinion ,which utilizes the technicality of law to redefine the patterns of transnational 
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governance, the majority touches upon several interesting elements and offers an oriented reconstruction 
of precedents in conjunction with a surgical elaboration of terminological distinctions. In particular, the 
judges define the publication of a statement on a webpage as non-commercial speech and therefore apply 
a ‘more searching First Amendment standard’,20 namely a more liberal approach in favour of corporate 
free speech and against mandatory requirements. However, the most important element is represented by 
the court’s and appellants’ construction of the paradigm of ‘regulation by information’ as a corporate–
state–consumer relationship that is constructed around positive ‘exceptional’ information that increases 
consumption, or unclear messages that can generate confusion and therefore does not define 
consumption.21 As explained below, the decision of the court and the position of the plaintiffs reveal the 
intrinsic flaws of certification as a system of corporate governance and diffused accountability: 
theoretically based on the free flow of information and the possibility for empowered consumers to shape 
companies’ behaviours, it is, on the contrary, deeply rooted in partiality and silence. 
Reading the final decision of the court, it is clear how concerned judges are about the negative 
implications of information and transparency. According to the majority in the court, a statute that 
compels an issuer to define its products as ‘not found to be “DRC conflict free”’ would be the same as 
requiring the issuer to ‘confess blood on its hands’ and would therefore ‘interfere with the exercise of the 
freedom of speech under the First Amendment’.22 Even if the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC regulation 
only require the issuer to disclose geographical and factual information about the source of component 
minerals contained in the products, the court concludes that this information would invite public scrutiny 
and would marginalize the issuers as the ‘scarlet letter’ segregated Hester Prynne.23 Therefore, no public 
authority – including Congress – should have the power and the legitimacy to require an issuer to publish 
on a website a statement that would make consumers conclude that ‘its products are ethically tainted’ or 
that may convey ‘moral responsibility for the Congo war’.24  
For the appellants, the problem does not rely on the disclosure requirement, but on the way in which 




[a]ppellants raise no First Amendment objection to the obligation to find out which of their 
products fail to qualify as ‘DRC conflict free’ within the meaning of the statutory definition. Nor 
do they challenge the obligation to list those products in a report for investors. […] they object only 
to the Rule’s requirement to describe the listed products with the catchphrase ‘not been found to be 
“DRC conflict free.”’25  
The corporate position, which is affirmed/legitimated by the judgment of the court, reveals that issuers 
and producers are not trying to impede the disclosure of certain negative information, but they are mainly 
interested in avoiding the use of a straightforward sentence that would allow consumers to immediately 
understand the link between the products and the situation of instability and exploitation that is 
characteristic of certain mines in DRC.  
As Fleming discusses in his contribution to this volume, certifications and statements become a ‘tactical 
truth-telling’, a visual way to inoculate a particular construction of the value chain. In this neoliberal 
wonderland, respect for national and international laws becomes an exception that can be marketed, while 
links with slave labour and armed groups are concealed and tagged as controversial or misleading for the 
public and presented to consumers in a confusing manner so that they cannot be fully understood and 
therefore cannot affect purchasing behaviours. On the other hand, the use of the freedom of speech 
argument and support for the certification system reveal capital’s attempts to smuggle a small, albeit 
somewhat confusing, dose of truth into the illusion of self-governance, codes of conduct, public 
statements, sustainability certifications and ecolabels. Issuers use ‘certain truths in an attempt to defend 
broader discursive settings that on their own would be considered false’, a condition that ‘helps maintain 
the illusion’ that consumers are actually informed and therefore can make a difference (see Fleming, this 
volume). 
Conclusion 
The use of certifications and labels as instruments of corporate control assumes that transparency in the 
market and competition will reward virtuous producers and sanction their competitors. However, the 
NMA II case presented in this article exposes the existence of a strong economic interest behind 
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asymmetry of information and the selective use of logos. Companies and businesses may accept being 
regulated by the market as long as they have the power to determine what information is available to 
consumers and to present it in the way that best suits their economic interests. Moreover, the effectiveness 
of market-based solutions on market-generated negative externalities is also frustrated by capital 
concentration as a crucial feature of oligopolistic capitalism. Let’s think, for example, about the case of 
Annie’s Homegrown, a socially responsible company that uses natural and organic ingredients and 
advocates for mandatory labelling of genetically modified food (Crooks, 2014).  
In 2014 General Mills, a company that unleashed $2 million to fight against the very same state-based 
labelling initiatives Annie’s supports (Crooks, 2014; Solomon, 2014), realized the economic opportunity 
behind the fact that ‘[p]owerful consumer shifts toward products with simple, organic and natural 
ingredients from companies that share consumers’ core values show no signs of letting up’ and acquired 
Annie’s Homegrown (Solomon, 2014). The extra profits generated from the exceptionalism of organic 
production and communication transparency will thus be appropriated by the same capital that is making 
money out of the ‘normalization’ of genetically modified products and misinformation of consumers. And 
the same is happening with Monsanto, the GMO-seeds company that has been buying producers of 
heirloom and non-GMOs seeds (Investment Watch, 2013). 
As a reaction to the inherent flaws of self-regulation and to the inactivity of many governments, there has 
been a surge in the number of actions that try to expose the true cost of products and provide consumers 
with more appropriate information about their value chains. Among these, it is worth recalling ‘Buycott’ 
– a digital application that ‘helps you to organize your everyday consumer spending so you can fund 
causes you support and avoid funding those you disagree with’ and that takes into account ownership and 
the hidden financial links (www.buycott.com). On the workers’ side, in 2014 a campaign aimed at 
consumers involved Tesco workers replacing price tags in the supermarkets with fake labels in support of 
their ‘living wage action’ in order to create a buyer–worker alliance against capitalist exploitation 
(McAteer, 2014). Different is the case of the anti-occupation actions that are continuously realized in the 
framework of the Boycott, Divest and Sanction (BDS) campaign, where goods that are produced illegally 
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in Israeli settlements or whose issuers profit from the occupation of Palestine are removed from the 
shelves so that they no longer represent a purchasing alternative (BDS Movement, 2010).  
Although interesting, all these initiatives are too local or dependent on consumers’ activism to produce an 
effective redefinition of current forms of production. In particular, they remain entrapped in the paradigm 
of consumption as a transforming power and can hardly cope with capital’s mobility and accumulation 
strategies. For this reason, a democratic, open, widespread, coercive and publicly accessible system of 
control appears to be the trajectory to follow. Even in the current framework of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules, governments can still impose qualitative requirements on some products that are imported 
within their territories and sanction violations of these rules.26 One example is the European Union 
Timber Regulation, which introduces a system of mandatory certification and sanctions for anyone who 
introduces into a member state timber that was obtained illegally (Gereats and Natens, 2014). Finally, 
California and the UK – among others – have introduced national legal architectures that may be utilized 
to challenge labour violations committed along the supply chain, independently from their geography and 
the nationality of the perpetrator.27 
In the era of Facebook and smartphones, a critical engagement with corporations and capitalism should be 
particularly cautious when it comes to the quality of available information and the use of shiny logos and 
market-based remedies for exploitation and private accumulation. The proliferation of labels and 
information overdose are neoliberal tactics that exploit exceptionalism to fill (wealthy) consumers’ desire 
to change the world while hiding the root causes of deprivation and inequality (Marks, 2011). It is a 
matter of law, policy, culture and language. The socio-economic inequality of capitalist production cannot 
be properly addressed as long as ‘organic’, ‘slave-free’ and ‘conflict-free’ are labels and sources of extra 
profit while ‘inorganic’, ‘tainted with slavery’ and ‘supporting armed conflict’ are the hidden normality 
rather than being a source of accountability.28 
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